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CVE-2020-16630 TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key cr...

MediumCVSS 6.8 EPSS 0.69%
Published
Updated
Exploit status
No public exploit known

Description

TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission.

Affected products

ProductAffected versionsFixed in
ti 15.4-stack All versions No fix listed
ti ble5-stack All versions No fix listed
ti dynamic multi-protocal manager All versions No fix listed
ti easylink All versions No fix listed
ti openthread All versions No fix listed
ti z-stack All versions No fix listed
ti real-time operating system All versions No fix listed

References