CVE-2020-16630 TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key cr...
MediumCVSS 6.8
EPSS 0.69%
- Published
- Updated
- Exploit status
- No public exploit known
Description
TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission.
Affected products
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| ti 15.4-stack | All versions | No fix listed |
| ti ble5-stack | All versions | No fix listed |
| ti dynamic multi-protocal manager | All versions | No fix listed |
| ti easylink | All versions | No fix listed |
| ti openthread | All versions | No fix listed |
| ti z-stack | All versions | No fix listed |
| ti real-time operating system | All versions | No fix listed |
References
- software-dl.ti.com vendor-advisory
- www.usenix.org exploit third-party-advisory