CVE-2025-53627 Meshtastic firmware allows forged DMs with no PKC to show up as encrypted
- Published
- Updated
- Exploit status
- No public exploit known
- CISA SSVC
- Proof of concept public · automatable: no · technical impact: partial
Description
Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. The Meshtastic firmware (starting from version 2.5) introduces asymmetric encryption (PKI) for direct messages, but when the pki_encrypted flag is missing, the firmware silently falls back to legacy AES-256-CTR channel encryption. This was an intentional decision to maintain backwards compatibility. However, the end-user applications, like Web app, iOS/Android app, and applications built on top of Meshtastic using the SDK, did not have a way to differentiate between end-to-end encrypted DMs and the legacy DMs. This creates a downgrade attack path where adversaries who know a shared channel key can craft and inject spoofed direct messages that are displayed as if they were PKC encrypted. Users are not given any feedback of whether a direct message was decrypted with PKI or with legacy symmetric encryption, undermining the expected security guarantees of the PKI rollout. Version 2.7.15 fixes this issue.
Upgrade path
2 packages: 1 fixed.
| Package | Affected | Fixed in | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| meshtastic firmware | >= 2.5.0, < 2.7.15 | 2.7.15 | Fixed |
| meshtastic firmware | = >= 2.5, < 2.7.15 | No fix listed | Versions listed |
Affected products
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| meshtastic firmware | = >= 2.5, < 2.7.15 | No fix listed |
| meshtastic firmware | >= 2.5.0, < 2.7.15 | 2.7.15 |
References
- https://github.com/meshtastic/firmware/security/advisories/GHSA-377p-prwp-4hwf exploit vendor-advisory