CVE-2026-41583 ZEBRA: Consensus Divergence in Transparent Sighash Hash-Type Handling
- Published
- Updated
- Exploit status
- No public exploit known
Description
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.1 and prior to zebra-script version 5.0.2, after a refactoring, Zebra failed to validate a consensus rule that restricted the possible values of sighash hash types for V5 transactions which were enabled in the NU5 network upgrade. Zebra nodes could thus accept and eventually mine a block that would be considered invalid by zcashd nodes, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes. In a similar vein, for V4 transactions, Zebra mistakenly used the "canonical" hash type when computing the sighash while zcashd (correctly per the spec) uses the raw value, which could also crate a consensus split. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-script version 5.0.2.
Affected products
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| ZcashFoundation zebra | = zebrad < 4.3.1 | No fix listed |
| ZcashFoundation zebra | = zebra-script < 5.0.2 | No fix listed |
| crates.io zebrad(crates.io) | < 4.3.1 | 4.3.1 |
| crates.io zebra-script(crates.io) | < 5.0.2 | 5.0.2 |
| zfnd zebra-script | < 5.0.2 | 5.0.2 |
| zfnd zebrad | < 4.3.1 | 4.3.1 |
References
- https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jj vendor-advisory
- nvd.nist.gov third-party-advisory vendor-advisory
- github.com patch
- github.com product
- github.com