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CVE-2026-44040 UltraVNC vncauth.c uses time-seeded libc rand() to generate VNC authentication challenge bytes

MediumCVSS 6.5 EPSS 0.40%
Published
Updated
Exploit status
No public exploit known
CISA SSVC
No known exploitation · automatable: no · technical impact: partial

Description

UltraVNC through 1.8.2.2 uses a cryptographically weak pseudo-random number generator to produce VNC authentication challenge bytes. In rfb/vncauth.c:119-129, the vncRandomBytes() function seeds libc rand() with time(0) + getpid() + rand() and generates a 16-byte challenge. The combined seed space is approximately 31 bits (libc rand() internal state) and is entirely determined by publicly-observable values (wall-clock time and process ID). An attacker who can observe the authentication exchange can enumerate the seed space and predict the challenge within seconds, enabling forgery or offline brute-forcing of responses. Note: on Windows, the active code path may use vncEncryptBytes2.cpp which calls CryptGenRandom; reachability on shipped Windows binaries requires compile-graph verification and is under investigation.

Upgrade path

1 package: 1 fixed.

PackageAffectedFixed inStatus
uvnc UltraVNC <= 1.8.2.2 after 1.8.2.2 Fixed

Affected products

ProductAffected versionsFixed in
uvnc UltraVNC <= 1.8.2.2 No fix listed

References