CVE-2026-44040 UltraVNC vncauth.c uses time-seeded libc rand() to generate VNC authentication challenge bytes
- Published
- Updated
- Exploit status
- No public exploit known
- CISA SSVC
- No known exploitation · automatable: no · technical impact: partial
Description
UltraVNC through 1.8.2.2 uses a cryptographically weak pseudo-random number generator to produce VNC authentication challenge bytes. In rfb/vncauth.c:119-129, the vncRandomBytes() function seeds libc rand() with time(0) + getpid() + rand() and generates a 16-byte challenge. The combined seed space is approximately 31 bits (libc rand() internal state) and is entirely determined by publicly-observable values (wall-clock time and process ID). An attacker who can observe the authentication exchange can enumerate the seed space and predict the challenge within seconds, enabling forgery or offline brute-forcing of responses. Note: on Windows, the active code path may use vncEncryptBytes2.cpp which calls CryptGenRandom; reachability on shipped Windows binaries requires compile-graph verification and is under investigation.
Upgrade path
1 package: 1 fixed.
| Package | Affected | Fixed in | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| uvnc UltraVNC | <= 1.8.2.2 | after 1.8.2.2 | Fixed |
Affected products
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| uvnc UltraVNC | <= 1.8.2.2 | No fix listed |
References
- UltraVNC project page product release-notes vendor-advisory
- UltraVNC source repository product
- www.securin.io