CVE-2026-47174 Duck Site: Untrusted pull request code can trigger privileged production deployment
- Published
- Updated
- Exploit status
- No public exploit known
- CISA SSVC
- Proof of concept public · automatable: no · technical impact: total
- Technology
- Docker
Description
In Duck Site before version 1.0.1, the repository has a deploy workflow that runs after the build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, while the deploy workflow runs with package-write permissions and deployment secrets. If an attacker can make a pull request build satisfy the deploy workflow’s main branch condition, the deploy job checks out the triggering workflow commit, builds it into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers Dokploy deployment. This can allow attacker-controlled pull request code to become the deployed production site image without being merged. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.1.
Upgrade path
1 package: 0 fixed.
| Package | Affected | Fixed in | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| duck-organization duck-site | = < 1.0.1 | No fix listed | Versions listed |
Affected products
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| duck-organization duck-site | = < 1.0.1 | No fix listed |