CVE-2026-48168 PraisonAI: GitHub Actions Claude workflow command injection via unquoted PR branch name
- Published
- Updated
- Exploit status
- No public exploit known
- CISA SSVC
- Proof of concept public · automatable: yes · technical impact: total
Description
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 4.6.40, the bundled Claude GitHub Actions workflow is vulnerable to command injection because it embeds an attacker-controlled pull request branch name into a Bash run: block without quoting or validation. Additionally, the workflow allows any @claude comment to trigger the job regardless of whether the commenter is a trusted collaborator. An outside contributor can open a pull request from a fork whose branch name contains shell metacharacters and comment @claude, causing Bash to execute arbitrary shell code in the GitHub Actions runner. Because these commands run in a job holding a GitHub App token with write permissions, OIDC access, and gh/git access, the injection can be chained through $GITHUB_PATH to compromise later privileged steps, enabling repository writes, pull request and issue manipulation, or OIDC-token abuse. This issue has been fixed in version 4.6.40.
Upgrade path
1 package: 0 fixed.
| Package | Affected | Fixed in | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| MervinPraison PraisonAI | = < 4.6.40 | No fix listed | Versions listed |
Affected products
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| MervinPraison PraisonAI | = < 4.6.40 | No fix listed |