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CVE-2026-53604 nebula-mesh: CA private key not zeroized on web mobile-bundle error paths

HighCVSS 7.1 EPSS 0.18%
Published
Updated
Exploit status
No public exploit known
CISA SSVC
No known exploitation · automatable: no · technical impact: partial

Description

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.8, the web handler renderMobileBundle passes the real *pki.CAResolver directly into mobilebundle.Build. Inside Build, resolver.LoadByID decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a *pki.CAManager, but Build never calls CAManager.Wipe() on any return path. As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the web UI and Build returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB error, signing failure) — the plaintext CA private key remains on the Go heap, unwiped, until garbage collection. An attacker able to read process memory (core dump, swap, memory-scraping) can recover the CA signing key, which would allow minting arbitrary host certificates for the mesh. The API handler already does this correctly: it loads the CAManager, defer caMgr.Wipe(), and wraps it in caManagerResolver. Only the web path is affected. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.8.

Upgrade path

2 packages: 1 fixed.

PackageAffectedFixed inStatus
forgekeep nebula-mesh(Go) < 0.3.8; <= 0.3.7 0.3.8 Fixed
forgekeep nebula-mesh = < 0.3.8 No fix listed Versions listed

Affected products

ProductAffected versionsFixed in
forgekeep nebula-mesh(Go) < 0.3.8 0.3.8
forgekeep nebula-mesh = < 0.3.8 No fix listed
forgekeep nebula-mesh(Go) <= 0.3.7 No fix listed

References