CVE-2026-53604 nebula-mesh: CA private key not zeroized on web mobile-bundle error paths
- Published
- Updated
- Exploit status
- No public exploit known
- CISA SSVC
- No known exploitation · automatable: no · technical impact: partial
Description
nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.8, the web handler renderMobileBundle passes the real *pki.CAResolver directly into mobilebundle.Build. Inside Build, resolver.LoadByID decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a *pki.CAManager, but Build never calls CAManager.Wipe() on any return path. As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the web UI and Build returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB error, signing failure) — the plaintext CA private key remains on the Go heap, unwiped, until garbage collection. An attacker able to read process memory (core dump, swap, memory-scraping) can recover the CA signing key, which would allow minting arbitrary host certificates for the mesh. The API handler already does this correctly: it loads the CAManager, defer caMgr.Wipe(), and wraps it in caManagerResolver. Only the web path is affected. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.8.
Upgrade path
2 packages: 1 fixed.
| Package | Affected | Fixed in | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| forgekeep nebula-mesh(Go) | < 0.3.8; <= 0.3.7 | 0.3.8 | Fixed |
| forgekeep nebula-mesh | = < 0.3.8 | No fix listed | Versions listed |
Affected products
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| forgekeep nebula-mesh(Go) | < 0.3.8 | 0.3.8 |
| forgekeep nebula-mesh | = < 0.3.8 | No fix listed |
| forgekeep nebula-mesh(Go) | <= 0.3.7 | No fix listed |
References
- https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/security/advisories/GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5 vendor-advisory
- https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/commit/1f1ab9aa8472239763d967e3d50a3cd53a1a79b9 patch
- github.com product
- https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/releases/tag/v0.3.8
- github.com
- ENISA EUVD EUVD-2026-71717 third-party-advisory