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CVE-2026-62334 OpenVM's OpenVmHalo2Verifier self-call can bypass proof verification

HighCVSS 8.7 EPSS 0.53%
Published
Updated
Exploit status
No public exploit known

Description

OpenVM is a performant and modular zkVM framework built for customization and extensibility. Before 1.7.0 in the 1.x line and in affected 2.0 and 2.1 prereleases, OpenVmHalo2Verifier.verify constructs raw proof calldata from user-controlled proofData, performs a staticcall to address(this), and treats a successful call as proof acceptance. If the first four proof bytes match another external selector exposed by the wrapper, dispatch can invoke a successful non-verifier function instead of the generated Halo2 fallback verifier. Applications using the generated Solidity wrapper can consequently accept arbitrary app commitments and public values without checking the proof suffix, accumulator, app commitments or public values. This issue is fixed in versions 1.7.0, 2.0.0-rc.3 and 2.1.0-preview.

Affected products

ProductAffected versionsFixed in
openvm-org openvm = < 1.7.0 No fix listed
openvm-org openvm = >= 2.0.0-alpha, < 2.0.0-rc.3 No fix listed
openvm-org openvm = >= 2.1.0-dev.0, < 2.1.0-preview No fix listed

References