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CVE-2026-63502 Yeti: Path traversal in ExportTask name allows authenticated arbitrary file read and write

HighCVSS 8.3 EPSS 0.41%
Published
Updated
Exploit status
No public exploit known
CISA SSVC
Proof of concept public · automatable: no · technical impact: total

Description

Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence platform and pipeline. Prior to 2.5.1, YETI derives ExportTask.file_name from the user-controlled task name and passes it to core/clients/file_storage/classes/local_storage.py without sanitizing traversal sequences or enforcing path confinement. A low-privileged authenticated user using the default local storage backend can call POST /api/v2/tasks/export/new with a traversal name and use ExportTask.file_contents through GET /api/v2/tasks/export/{export_id}/content to read files accessible to the YETI service account. Running ExportTask.run() can also write attacker-controlled export output to an attacker-selected writable path. The impact depends on the service account's filesystem permissions, and universal code execution is not established. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.1.

Upgrade path

1 package: 0 fixed.

PackageAffectedFixed inStatus
yeti-platform yeti = <= 2.5.0 No fix listed Versions listed

Affected products

ProductAffected versionsFixed in
yeti-platform yeti = <= 2.5.0 No fix listed

References