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CVE-2026-77776 Headroom Proxy Treats the Client-Supplied x-headroom-user-id Header as an Authenticated Identity

CriticalCVSS 9.3 EPSS 0.61%
Published
Updated
Exploit status
No public exploit known
CISA SSVC
No known exploitation · automatable: yes · technical impact: total
Technology
Docker

Description

Headroom's LLM proxy derives the memory owner from the x-headroom-user-id request header. The header is read directly at several points in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py, including the chat completion and websocket paths, and nothing binds the value to the caller. A client can therefore name another user's identifier and read or write that user's stored LLM memory. The fix introduces a single resolve_memory_identity seam in headroom/proxy/identity.py that honors the header only for loopback or allowlisted callers and otherwise binds the identity to the proxy-token fingerprint or the operating system user. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication.

Upgrade path

1 package: 1 fixed.

PackageAffectedFixed inStatus
pypi headroom-ai(PyPI) < 0.36.1 0.36.1 Fixed

Affected products

ProductAffected versionsFixed in
pypi headroom-ai(PyPI) < 0.36.1 0.36.1

References