CVE-2026-77776 Headroom Proxy Treats the Client-Supplied x-headroom-user-id Header as an Authenticated Identity
- Published
- Updated
- Exploit status
- No public exploit known
- CISA SSVC
- No known exploitation · automatable: yes · technical impact: total
- Technology
- Docker
Description
Headroom's LLM proxy derives the memory owner from the x-headroom-user-id request header. The header is read directly at several points in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py, including the chat completion and websocket paths, and nothing binds the value to the caller. A client can therefore name another user's identifier and read or write that user's stored LLM memory. The fix introduces a single resolve_memory_identity seam in headroom/proxy/identity.py that honors the header only for loopback or allowlisted callers and otherwise binds the identity to the proxy-token fingerprint or the operating system user. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication.
Upgrade path
1 package: 1 fixed.
| Package | Affected | Fixed in | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| pypi headroom-ai(PyPI) | < 0.36.1 | 0.36.1 | Fixed |
Affected products
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| pypi headroom-ai(PyPI) | < 0.36.1 | 0.36.1 |
References
- Pull Request #2207 addressing the assessment findings issue-tracking patch
- Header handling in the OpenAI proxy handler at v0.29.0 technical-description
- resolve_memory_identity seam introduced by the fix technical-description
- github.com product
- VulnCheck Advisory: Headroom Proxy Treats the Client-Supplied x-headroom-user-id Header as an Authenticated Identity third-party-advisory
- ENISA EUVD EUVD-2026-63905 third-party-advisory