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CVE-2026-81315 MCP DNS-rebinding origin check in AshAi is bypassed by a spoofed X-Forwarded-Proto header

HighCVSS 7.4 EPSS 0.23%
Published
Updated
Exploit status
No public exploit known
CISA SSVC
Proof of concept public · automatable: no · technical impact: total

Description

Origin Validation Error vulnerability in ash-project ash_ai allows a malicious web page to bypass the MCP server's DNS-rebinding protection and issue cross-site requests to a user's local MCP server with that user's actor.

In AshAi.Mcp.Server, with the default allowed_origins: nil, origin_allowed?/3 accepts an origin when uri.host == conn.host and the forwarded scheme is https. Both values are attacker-controlled: conn.host comes from the Host header and the scheme is read from the raw x-forwarded-proto header with no trusted-proxy check. Under DNS rebinding the browser sends the attacker's origin and a matching host, and page JavaScript may set X-Forwarded-Proto: https, so the check passes with no TLS or proxy involved. The fix trusts only localhost origins by default; other origins require an explicit allowed_origins allowlist.

This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0.

Upgrade path

1 package: 1 fixed.

PackageAffectedFixed inStatus
ash-project ash ai >= 0.8.0, < 1.0.0; >= c94f0b17fbe252f68755ba512678586164ba6139, < 28af68d73134df0b8fb3aa6ab03e8fd795b07c21 1.0.0, 28af68d73134df0b8fb3aa6ab03e8fd795b07c21 Fixed

Affected products

ProductAffected versionsFixed in
ash-project ash ai >= 0.8.0, < 1.0.0 1.0.0
ash-project ash ai >= c94f0b17fbe252f68755ba512678586164ba6139, < 28af68d73134df0b8fb3aa6ab03e8fd795b07c21 28af68d73134df0b8fb3aa6ab03e8fd795b07c21

References