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CVE-2026-81853 AshAdmin composite primary key decoding accepts arbitrary fields, enabling a secret-attribute oracle

LowCVSS 2.3 EPSS 0.33%
Published
Updated
Exploit status
No public exploit known
CISA SSVC
Proof of concept public · automatable: no · technical impact: partial

Description

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_admin turns a record-lookup URL into an equality oracle over sensitive attributes.

AshAdmin.Helpers.decode_primary_key/2 decodes the composite-primary-key form (Base64 plus ETF) and returns the decoded map verbatim as the lookup filter, without checking that its keys are the resource's primary-key fields. The deserialization guards bound size, block new atoms and funs, and reject nested expressions, but none restricts which fields come back, and :safe still allows any already-interned attribute name. An attacker can therefore encode %{api_token: "guess"} and have it spliced into the lookup filter, brute-forcing a sensitive attribute value (API token, reset token) one equality guess at a time; Map.to_list/1 also accepts structs, yielding a bogus struct key. The fix rejects any decoded key that is not a real primary-key field.

This issue affects ash_admin: from 0.1.0 before 1.3.1.

Upgrade path

1 package: 1 fixed.

PackageAffectedFixed inStatus
ash-project ash admin >= 0.1.0, < 1.3.1; >= 98b03baa8422b94dd13e305bf08b8ee3f7232c7b, < 3c3e905d47f1155dcc1ca3fb347348b05a66065a 1.3.1, 3c3e905d47f1155dcc1ca3fb347348b05a66065a Fixed

Affected products

ProductAffected versionsFixed in
ash-project ash admin >= 0.1.0, < 1.3.1 1.3.1
ash-project ash admin >= 98b03baa8422b94dd13e305bf08b8ee3f7232c7b, < 3c3e905d47f1155dcc1ca3fb347348b05a66065a 3c3e905d47f1155dcc1ca3fb347348b05a66065a

References