CVE-2026-82736 Ash.Type.CiString validates length and match constraints before case folding, allowing constraint bypass
- Published
- Updated
- Exploit status
- No public exploit known
Description
Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize vulnerability in ash-project ash lets an attacker store a case-insensitive string value that violates its length or match constraints.
Ash.Type.CiString.apply_constraints/2 (lib/ash/type/ci_string.ex) validated the max_length, min_length, and match constraints against the value as submitted, while the type case-folds the string (per its casing) for storage and comparison. Because validation ran before folding, an attacker can submit a value whose folded form breaks a constraint but whose original form passes: for example, against a match pattern requiring uppercase, an uppercase value that is stored lowercased persists a value the pattern rejects. The fix case-folds the value at the start of apply_constraints/2, so the constraints are checked against the form that is actually stored.
This issue affects ash: from 1.29.0-rc0 before 3.32.2.
Affected products
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| ash-project ash | >= 1.29.0-rc0, < 3.32.2 | 3.32.2 |
| ash-project ash | >= f6f5d194bfc7802bd32e48bf2eabd2d97a0109a4, < d8320b0127c8ef453679d70e5dd23a9506951d21 | d8320b0127c8ef453679d70e5dd23a9506951d21 |
References
- github.com exploit related vendor-advisory
- cna.erlef.org related
- osv.dev related
- github.com patch