The lock-counter implementation in utils/mount.ecryptfs_private.c in ecryptfs-utils before 90 allows local users to overwrite arbitrary files via unspecified vectors.
Product
ecryptfs utils vulnerabilities
7 published CVES affecting ecryptfs utils, from public sources (CVE.org, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, OSV).
- Total
- 7
- Critical
- 0
- High
- 1
- Medium
- 3
- Low
- 3
- Unscored
- 0
- CISA KEV
- 0
Latest ecryptfs utils CVEs
Newest publication first
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LowCVSS 3.6
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MediumCVSS 4.6
utils/ecryptfs-recover-private in ecryptfs-utils before 90 does not establish a subdirectory with safe permissions, which might allow local users to bypass intended access restrictions via standard filesystem operations during the recovery process.
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MediumCVSS 4.4
The encrypted private-directory setup process in utils/ecryptfs-setup-private in ecryptfs-utils before 90 does not properly ensure that the passphrase file is created, which might allow local users to bypass intended access restrictions at a certain time in the new-user creation...
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LowCVSS 2.1
utils/mount.ecryptfs_private.c in ecryptfs-utils before 90 does not properly maintain the mtab file during error conditions, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (table corruption) or bypass intended unmounting restrictions via a umount system call.
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LowCVSS 2.1
utils/mount.ecryptfs_private.c in ecryptfs-utils before 90 does not properly check mountpoint permissions, which allows local users to remove directories via a umount system call.
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MediumCVSS 4.6
utils/mount.ecryptfs_private.c in ecryptfs-utils before 90 does not properly check mountpoint permissions, which allows local users to effectively replace any directory with a new filesystem, and consequently gain privileges, via a mount system call.
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HighCVSS 7.2
The (1) ecryptfs-setup-private, (2) ecryptfs-setup-confidential, and (3) ecryptfs-setup-pam-wrapped.sh scripts in ecryptfs-utils 45 through 61 in eCryptfs place cleartext passwords on command lines, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information by listing the process.
Sources: CVE.org, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, OSV and public exploit-reference metadata. Product matching comes from the published CVE records. A proof-of-concept means public code exists; it is not evidence of exploitation.