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gotenna pro vulnerabilities

10 published CVES affecting gotenna pro, from public sources (CVE.org, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, OSV).

Total
10
Critical
0
High
3
Medium
6
Low
1
Unscored
0
CISA KEV
0

Latest gotenna pro CVEs

Newest publication first

  1. MediumCVSS 5.3 EPSS 0.14%

    The goTenna Pro App does not inject extra characters into broadcasted frames to obfuscate the length of messages. This makes it possible to tell the length of the payload regardless of the encryption used.

  2. MediumCVSS 6.0 EPSS 0.11%

    In the goTenna Pro App there is a vulnerability that makes it possible to inject any custom message with any GID and Callsign using a software defined radio in existing goTenna mesh networks. This vulnerability can be exploited if the device is being used in an unencrypted enviro...

  3. LowCVSS 2.3 EPSS 0.10%

    The goTenna Pro App does not encrypt callsigns in messages. It is recommended to not use sensitive information in callsigns when using this and previous versions of the app and update your app to the current app version which uses AES-256 encryption for callsigns in encrypted ope...

  4. MediumCVSS 6.0 EPSS 0.08%

    The goTenna Pro App uses AES CTR type encryption for short, encrypted messages without any additional integrity checking mechanisms. This leaves messages malleable to an attacker that can access the message. It is recommended to continue to use encryption in the app and update to...

  5. MediumCVSS 5.1 EPSS 0.14%

    In the goTenna Pro App, the encryption keys are stored along with a static IV on the End User Device (EUD). This allows for complete decryption of keys stored on the EUD if physically compromised. This allows an attacker to decrypt all encrypted broadcast communications based on...

  6. MediumCVSS 6.0 EPSS 0.12%

    The goTenna Pro App uses a weak password for sharing encryption keys via the key broadcast method. If the broadcasted encryption key is captured over RF, and password is cracked via brute force attack, it is possible to decrypt it and use it to decrypt all future and past message...

Sources: CVE.org, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, OSV and public exploit-reference metadata. Product matching comes from the published CVE records. A proof-of-concept means public code exists; it is not evidence of exploitation.