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goTenna mesh firmware vulnerabilities

9 published CVES affecting goTenna mesh firmware, from public sources (CVE.org, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, OSV).

Total
9
Critical
0
High
2
Medium
7
Low
0
Unscored
0
CISA KEV
0

Latest goTenna mesh firmware CVEs

Newest publication first

  1. MediumCVSS 6.5 EPSS 0.16%

    An issue was discovered on goTenna v1 devices with app 5.5.3 and firmware 0.25.5. By default, the GID is the user's phone number unless they specifically opt out. A phone number is very sensitive information because it can be tied back to individuals. The app does not encrypt the...

  2. MediumCVSS 6.5 EPSS 0.23%

    An issue was discovered on goTenna v1 devices with app 5.5.3 and firmware 0.25.5. The app there makes it possible to inject any custom message (into existing v1 networks) with any GID and Callsign via a software defined radio. This can be exploited if the device is being used in...

  3. MediumCVSS 5.5 EPSS 0.15%

    An issue was discovered on goTenna v1 devices with app 5.5.3 and firmware 0.25.5. All packets sent over RF are also sent over UART with USB Shell, allowing someone with local access to gain information about the protocol and intercept sensitive data.

  4. MediumCVSS 6.5 EPSS 0.16%

    An issue was discovered on goTenna Mesh devices with app 5.5.3 and firmware 1.1.12. By default, a GID is the user's phone number unless they specifically opt out. A phone number is very sensitive information because it can be tied back to individuals. The app does not encrypt the...

  5. MediumCVSS 6.5 EPSS 0.13%

    An issue was discovered on goTenna Mesh devices with app 5.5.3 and firmware 1.1.12. It uses a custom implementation of encryption without any additional integrity checking mechanisms. This leaves messages malleable to an attacker that can access the message.

  6. MediumCVSS 6.5 EPSS 0.09%

    An issue was discovered on goTenna v1 devices with app 5.5.3 and firmware 0.25.5. The app uses a custom implementation of encryption without any additional integrity checking mechanisms. This leaves messages malleable to an attacker that can access the message.

Sources: CVE.org, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, OSV and public exploit-reference metadata. Product matching comes from the published CVE records. A proof-of-concept means public code exists; it is not evidence of exploitation.