In Keepalived through 2.2.4, the D-Bus policy does not sufficiently restrict the message destination, allowing any user to inspect and manipulate any property. This leads to access-control bypass in some situations in which an unrelated D-Bus system service has a settable (writab...
Vendor
keepalived vulnerabilities
6 published CVES affecting keepalived, from public sources (CVE.org, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, OSV).
- Total
- 6
- Critical
- 1
- High
- 1
- Medium
- 3
- Low
- 1
- Unscored
- 0
- CISA KEV
- 0
Products
Latest keepalived CVEs
Newest publication first
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MediumCVSS 5.4 EPSS 1.1%
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CriticalCVSS 9.8 EPSS 3.7%
keepalived before 2.0.7 has a heap-based buffer overflow when parsing HTTP status codes resulting in DoS or possibly unspecified other impact, because extract_status_code in lib/html.c has no validation of the status code and instead writes an unlimited amount of data to the heap...
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MediumCVSS 4.7 EPSS 0.37%
keepalived 2.0.8 didn't check for existing plain files when writing data to a temporary file upon a call to PrintData or PrintStats. If a local attacker had previously created a file with the expected name (e.g., /tmp/keepalived.data or /tmp/keepalived.stats), with read access fo...
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HighCVSS 7.5 EPSS 2.4%
keepalived 2.0.8 used mode 0666 when creating new temporary files upon a call to PrintData or PrintStats, potentially leaking sensitive information.
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MediumCVSS 4.7 EPSS 0.50%
keepalived 2.0.8 didn't check for pathnames with symlinks when writing data to a temporary file upon a call to PrintData or PrintStats. This allowed local users to overwrite arbitrary files if fs.protected_symlinks is set to 0, as demonstrated by a symlink from /tmp/keepalived.da...
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LowCVSS 3.6 EPSS 0.37%
The pidfile_write function in core/pidfile.c in keepalived 1.2.2 and earlier uses 0666 permissions for the (1) keepalived.pid, (2) checkers.pid, and (3) vrrp.pid files in /var/run/, which allows local users to kill arbitrary processes by writing a PID to one of these files.
Sources: CVE.org, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, OSV and public exploit-reference metadata. Product matching comes from the published CVE records. A proof-of-concept means public code exists; it is not evidence of exploitation.