Logs storing credentials are insufficiently protected and can be decoded through the use of open source tools.
Vendor
motorolasolutions vulnerabilities
8 published CVES affecting motorolasolutions, from public sources (CVE.org, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, OSV).
- Total
- 8
- Critical
- 1
- High
- 5
- Medium
- 2
- Low
- 0
- Unscored
- 0
- CISA KEV
- 0
Products
Latest motorolasolutions CVEs
Newest publication first
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HighCVSS 7.0 EPSS 0.21%
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HighCVSS 8.7 EPSS 0.34%
Transmitted data is logged between the device and the backend service. An attacker could use these logs to perform a replay attack to replicate calls.
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MediumCVSS 5.1 EPSS 0.10%
Sensitive customer information is stored in the device without encryption.
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HighCVSS 8.5 EPSS 0.16%
Utilizing default credentials, an attacker is able to log into the camera's operating system which could allow changes to be made to the operations or shutdown the camera requiring a physical reboot of the system.
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HighCVSS 7.0 EPSS 0.15%
An unauthorized user is able to gain access to sensitive data, including credentials, by physically retrieving the hard disk of the product as the data is stored in clear text.
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MediumCVSS 5.1 EPSS 0.25%
The affected product is vulnerable to an attacker modifying the bootloader by using custom arguments to bypass authentication and gain access to the file system and obtain password hashes.
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HighCVSS 7.5 EPSS 0.60%
The Motorola MOSCAD Toolbox software through 2022-05-02 relies on a cleartext password. It utilizes an MDLC driver to communicate with MOSCAD/ACE RTUs for engineering purposes. Access to these communications is protected by a password stored in cleartext in the wmdlcdrv.ini drive...
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CriticalCVSS 9.8 EPSS 0.44%
The Motorola MDLC protocol through 2022-05-02 mishandles message integrity. It supports three security modes: Plain, Legacy Encryption, and New Encryption. In Legacy Encryption mode, traffic is encrypted via the Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) block-cipher in ECB mode. This mode...
Sources: CVE.org, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, OSV and public exploit-reference metadata. Product matching comes from the published CVE records. A proof-of-concept means public code exists; it is not evidence of exploitation.