The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 stores certain cleartext information in memory, even though memory content may be accessible to an adversary through various avenues.
Vendor
smarsh vulnerabilities
8 published CVES affecting smarsh, from public sources (CVE.org, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, OSV).
- Total
- 8
- Critical
- 1
- High
- 3
- Medium
- 4
- Low
- 0
- Unscored
- 0
- CISA KEV
- 2
Products
Latest smarsh CVEs
Newest publication first
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MediumCVSS 5.3 EPSS 0.14%
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HighCVSS 7.5 EPSS 0.27%
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on the client side (e.g., the TM SGNL app) to do MD5 hashing, and then accepts the hash as the authentication credential.
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HighCVSS 7.5 EPSS 0.27%
The admin panel in the TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 allows attackers to discover usernames, e-mail addresses, passwords, and telephone numbers.
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CriticalCVSS 9.8 EPSS 0.33%
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 implements authentication through a long-lived credential (e.g., not a token with a short expiration time) that can be reused at a later date if discovered by an adversary.
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MediumCVSS 5.5 EPSS 0.10%
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on MD5 for password hashing, which opens up various attack possibilities (including rainbow tables) with low computational effort.
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MediumCVSS 5.3 EPSS 12.2% CISA KEV added 2025-07-01 Exploited in the wild
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 configures Spring Boot Actuator with an exposed heap dump endpoint at a /heapdump URI, as exploited in the wild in May 2025.
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MediumCVSS 4.0 EPSS 0.58% CISA KEV added 2025-07-01 Exploited in the wild
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 is based on a JSP application in which the heap content is roughly equivalent to a "core dump" in which a password previously sent over HTTP would be included in this dump, as exploited in the wild in May 2025.
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HighCVSS 7.5 EPSS 0.39%
The TeleMessage archiving backend through 2025-05-05 accepts API calls (to request an authentication token) from the TM SGNL (aka Archive Signal) app with the credentials of logfile for the user and enRR8UVVywXYbFkqU#QDPRkO for the password.
Sources: CVE.org, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, OSV and public exploit-reference metadata. Product matching comes from the published CVE records. A proof-of-concept means public code exists; it is not evidence of exploitation.