Vendor
5 published CVES affecting snapcore, from public sources (CVE.org, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, OSV).
Newest publication first
In snapd versions prior to 2.62, snapd failed to properly check the destination of symbolic links when extracting a snap. The snap format is a squashfs file-system image and so can contain symbolic links and other file types. Various file entries within the snap squashfs image (s...
In snapd versions prior to 2.62, snapd failed to properly check the file type when extracting a snap. The snap format is a squashfs file-system image and so can contain files that are non-regular files (such as pipes or sockets etc). Various file entries within the snap squashfs...
In snapd versions prior to 2.62, when using AppArmor for enforcement of sandbox permissions, snapd failed to restrict writes to the $HOME/bin path. In Ubuntu, when this path exists, it is automatically added to the users PATH. An attacker who could convince a user to install a ma...
The snapctl component within snapd allows a confined snap to interact with the snapd daemon to take certain privileged actions on behalf of the snap. It was found that snapctl did not properly parse command-line arguments, allowing an unprivileged user to trigger an authorised ac...
Race condition in snap-confine's must_mkdir_and_open_with_perms()
Sources: CVE.org, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, OSV and public exploit-reference metadata. Product matching comes from the published CVE records. A proof-of-concept means public code exists; it is not evidence of exploitation.